Written by Focus Group
Sudan finds itself on a precipice. Since 15 April 2023, when armed engagements broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan’s strained path towards supposed democratic reforms has been effectively halted by violence.
The groundwork for the ongoing conflict was set, in part, by the military coup d’état of 25 October 2021. At the coup’s onset, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the SAF, and Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, leader of the RSF, formed an alliance of convenience to oust the then-civilian-led transitional government and establish a military-led Sovereignty Council.
While al-Burhan and Hemedti claimed that the move was to safeguard Sudan’s transition from the alleged failures of the civilian government led by then-prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, the outbreak of open conflict between military and paramilitary belligerents on 15 April indicates nothing less than failure in that regard.
Rather than protect the populace, the military-led government cracked down on activists and neighbourhood resistance committees who, almost daily, protested against the coup and called for the military to “return to their barracks”. As Sudan’s economy and standard of living worsened in the wake of the coup, rebel-leader-turned-finance-minister, Gibril Ibrahim, could offer no solutions other than arbitrarily raising taxes and tariffs. Sudan’s path from the repressive regime of Omar al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) further faltered, and protesters increased in their fervour – only to be met with beatings and bullets.
The international community ignored Sudan’s people, who called for an end to military rule, and responded to the coup government as if Sudan’s new military leadership was an officially recognised entity, and al-Burhan and Hemedti were afforded an air of legitimacy. International organisational bodies, such as the United Nations and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, attempted to establish a new transitional government between the military-led Sovereignty Council and the civilian political coalition, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), through a Framework Agreement.
Comprising of five core issues, all of which would be debated through a series of workshops, the Framework Agreement’s signatories sought to have a fully formed political agreement by 6 April, which would have (optimistically) seen a new government sworn in on 11 April.
However, of the five core issues, the reformation of Sudan’s security sector and the associated unification of the armed forces (i.e., the merging of the SAF and RSF into a singular military), proved to be a destructive wedge between al-Burhan and Hemedti. The primary issue facing armed force integration, poorly acknowledged by international actors, is the vast economic web controlled by the SAF and RSF respectively.
A unified, singular military would mean a potential loss of economic power – the ‘true’ power exerted through capitalism – for either side, which created a so-called existential threat to the SAF and RSF’s leadership. While the international community hedged its bets on dealing with military and paramilitary leadership in misguided ‘good faith’, it failed to recognise the financial fault lines between the SAF and RSF which would widen the Framework Agreement impasse.
On 1 April, Framework Agreement signatories announced that negotiations between the SAF and RSF regarding armed force unification were failing. By the time the planned 6 April deadline rolled around, tensions between the SAF and RSF were believed to be high.
Just over a week later, gunfire and explosions would reverberate through Khartoum, and the misguided Framework Agreement process would bear only withered fruit.
Khartoum is now an active warzone, and Sudan’s Darfuri states are experiencing a resurgence in ethnic violence. A battle for dominance between two belligerents has killed thousands, and displaced over three million, while a worsening humanitarian crisis threatens millions more with hunger.
The conflict has been characterised by poor discipline from the SAF and RSF. The RSF, as per its namesake, is known for rapid deployments in the desert landscapes of Darfur. The RSF’s mobility, and the ease at which it can mobilise ground personnel on fleets of vehicles and motorbikes, could be considered the paramilitary group’s greatest strength. However, in the urban setting of Khartoum, RSF personnel have embedded themselves among the remaining civilian population. Reports of robbery, violence, and sexual violence are common, with the RSF seemingly operating more like a criminal syndicate than a fighting force.
In response, the SAF has elected to bomb and shell the capital with little regard for collateral damage. While intended to dislodge the RSF from residential areas, schools, and hospitals, the SAF’s shock and awe campaign is crippling key infrastructure such as telecommunications, water and sanitation, and electricity.
Civilians injured in the crossfire face a grim reality: Sudan’s health sector is failing, overburdened, and lacks the means to provide treatment.
Where Khartoum resembles a warzone, the Darfuri states resemble killing fields. Reports of mass rapes and death are prevalent, as are reports that the violence takes place along ethnic lines.
Further complicating the conflict is the inclusion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and the expansion of the warzone to Sudan’s southern states, such as South Kordofan. What was once a battle between two factions is starting to transform into total civil war, which is to say nothing of the supposed involvement of the Justice and Equality Movement and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army rebel groups, nor Sudan’s myriad armed tribal groups.
There is no ‘victor’ in the conflict. Neither a SAF nor an RSF victory will translate into a victory for Sudan or its populace. The conflict in Sudan is not akin to those seen in Ukraine or Ethiopia, where armed forces act under the auspices of political leadership. After all, since the 25 October 2021 coup, Sudan has effectively been without a functional government.
Rather, Sudan is fast becoming a free-for-all. A failed state. A reminder of the dangers of military takeovers and the fragility of democracy. And, as the international community falters with repeated, failed ceasefire and negotiation attempts, the tipping point comes closer and closer.
Focus Group
Focus Group is a diversified, intelligence-led risk management company. We advise on, execute and deliver risk management solutions using a holistic and proactive approach with the objective of helping our clients become more resilient in an increasingly complex, global and digitalised risk environment.
