Despite its vast mineral wealth, Zambia continues to face challenges in leveraging copper revenues to ensure inclusive socio-economic development, particularly within mining-host communities. One of the central governance challenges lies in the disconnect between traditional authorities and the state, particularly in regions where land falls under customary tenure.
As mining increasingly extends into these areas, the lack of alignment between customary leadership and statutory governance frameworks undermines local development efforts, exacerbates tensions and exclusion. Bridging this gap is essential for equitable resource governance and a necessary step toward overcoming the structural consequences of the Resource Curse and ensuring that mining benefits are both inclusive and sustainable.
As such, the interplay between customary authority and formal governmental power in Zambia’s mining sector continues to be a delicate balancing act. In north-western Zambia, where rich mineral deposits of copper, gold, cobalt, manganese, uranium, and precious stones are found, traditional leaders retain significant influence over land decisions and thus become the primary contact for prospectors and investors in the mining sector. At the same time, the state holds formal authority over mineral rights through the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development (MMMD). In other words, Zambia combines statutory and customary law in its governance systems.
On the one hand, the state owns sub-surface mineral resources; under statutory law, the president holds all mineral rights on behalf of the republic and its people. The MMMD and statutory instruments, such as the Mines and Minerals Development Act, govern mining rights and licensing centrally. The state is responsible for issuing permits for exploration, small-scale and large-scale mining operations, environmental oversight and revenue mechanisms – including environmental impact assessments and royalty structures.
Importantly, the state is responsible for developing and implementing investment instruments. In this regard, the state recently established the Zambia Minerals Investment Corporation Limited to serve as a special-purpose vehicle for trade and investment in minerals to ensure benefits accrue for Zambians beyond statutory obligations.
On the other hand, customary authorities manage the land, particularly rural land where many of the mineral resources outlined above lie. Customary law points out that land remains under the oversight of chiefs and local authorities, who are the custodians on behalf of communities and not owners of the land. As such, chiefs hold significant cultural and social legitimacy within their communities, where they are responsible for guiding consent and land negotiations for mining companies seeking to operate on customary land. In addition, they are responsible for conflict mediation and compensation discussions to ensure that communities benefit from mining activities.
In practice, however, this dual system comes with ongoing tension between state-led regulatory frameworks and traditional governance systems. As a result, mining-host communities bear the brunt of these tensions and are the most heavily impacted.
For instance, in July 2011, an agreement was signed between Chief Musele of north-western Zambia and Kalumbila Minerals Limited (KML), a subsidiary of First Quantum Minerals Limited (FQM), concerning 518 km² of surface rights. The purpose of the agreement was to “establish a framework for cooperation”through which both parties expressed their intention to collaborate on the allocation, development, and management of land for the Trident Project. In practice, though, the agreement aimed to transfer property rights over the 518 km² of customary land under the Musele chiefdom to FQM and KML.
In exchange, Chief Musele was to receive a payment of $259,000, with 80% of the amount payable once surface rights were formally secured. The agreement also outlined FQM’s responsibilities regarding compensation and resettlement of affected communities. In February 2013, a ministerial task force determined that the agreement was invalid. Under Zambia’s Lands Act of 1995, traditional leaders are legally prohibited from transferring more than 250 hectares of customary land. As a result, the agreement was declared unenforceable, and the task force recommended restarting the land acquisition process, requiring formal approval from the president.
This points to the tension between state-led regulatory frameworks and traditional governance systems, particularly the provisions of Zambia’s Lands Act of 1995, which prohibits the transfer of large tracts of customary land. Importantly, such agreements undermine community consultation processes and weaken statutory protections.
A 2020 ethnographic study that explored how labour unions influence tribal, kinship and class identities in Zambia’s mining sector revealed how traditional leaders have played an essential role in shaping who gets access to unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. Chiefs used their authority to define local terms in both geographic and tribal and kinship ones, insisting that applicants must belong to specific tribes or speak local languages to qualify.
This meant that people living relatively close by, who might otherwise be considered local in legal terms, were excluded if they were not part of the “correct” tribal group or lacked the required linguistic or cultural indicators. For instance, in Lumwana, Solwezi-based Kaonde applicants were favoured, and Chief Musele’s Lunda were initially excluded from certain jobs simply because of their tribal identity, despite their physical proximity.
These practices had significant implications for labour outcomes. By filtering access according to tribal criteria enforced by chiefs, many unskilled or semi-skilled positions went disproportionately to community members with strong tribal ties, while those who were skilled or qualified from “non-local” tribes nearby were disregarded. This highlighted hierarchies of opportunity that aligned closely with tribal affiliation rather than merit.
Simultaneously, chiefs’ involvement in recruitment reinforced their influence over both formal structures, such as human resources divisions of companies as well as informal social norms. This showed that the recruitment process became a formality of HR policies, deeply rooted as it was, and influenced by local politics, patronage, and identity. These dynamics further perpetuate how customary structures influence socio-economic outcomes from mining activities and thus are not fully aligned with national regulatory intent.
Efforts around integrating customary governance into formal legal frameworks have been a productive starting point. The ongoing review of the Lands Act of 1995 aims to clarify the legal roles of traditional leaders in land-based investments, while platforms such as the Zambia Land Alliance are leading dialogue between chiefs, communities, and government actors to improve accountability mechanisms.
Zambia is undergoing a significant shift in its approach to mineral resource governance, moving from an inactive role of royalty collection to active participation in the mining value chain. Through ZCCM Investment Holdings and the newly established Zambia Minerals Investment Corporation Limited, the government now has tools to engage more strategically with mining operations. This allows the state to negotiate mineral pricing, verify production declarations, and secure production-based revenue, improving transparency and boosting fiscal returns. This marks a deliberate move toward resource nationalism that prioritises long-term economic stability over short-term gains.
In accordance with this shift, Zambia has entered a joint venture with global commodities trader Mercuria, named Industrial Resources Limited, enabling it to directly participate in copper trading and capture greater value from its mineral exports. Additionally, the government is negotiating higher equity stakes, potentially over 50%, in new mining projects, reflecting an ambition to enhance both social impact and national revenue. These developments demonstrate an affirmation of state power in a sector historically dominated by foreign firms, and they represent a potential model for other resource-rich countries seeking to balance development goals with global market participation.
Legislative instruments such as the recently signed Geological Minerals Development Act, the 2024 Mineral Resources Commission Act, and the 2015 Gold Mining Development Act are set to enforce corporate obligations around local employment, procurement, and training. Importantly, reforms targeting artisanal and small-scale mining, through cooperative models, technical capacity-building, and market integration, seek to formalise the sector and enable inclusive economic participation.
In shifting power dynamics and providing pathways that break free from the Resource Curse, a key area is bridging the gap between traditional leadership and state authority in delivering socio-economic development in Zambian mining-host communities. This requires deliberate, legally sound reforms that provide clarity and strong transparency and accountability measures. As such, clearly defined roles, rights, responsibilities and the limitations of traditional leaders in key areas such as land leasing, community consultation processes and contract negotiations will equip both traditional and state leadership to ensure that mining development holistically benefits the people of Zambia.
Busisipho Siyobi is the Programme Head of the Natural Resource Governance Programme at GGA. Prior to joining GGA, she headed up the Corporate Intelligence Monitor desk at S-RM Intelligence and Risk Consulting. Busisipho holds an MPhil in Public Policy and Administration from the University of Cape Town with a research focus on CSR within the South African mining industry. During her Masters, she worked as a research scholar at the South African Institute of International Affairs.
