The growing military presence of Russia in Madagascar further calls into question the wisdom of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) decision not to suspend Madagascar for the “coupvolution” that deposed President Andry Rajoelina on 12 October 2025 and brought Colonel Michael Randrianirina to power.
Randrianirina’s subsequent drift towards Russia’s camp and his suppression of dissent are raising concerns that his regime may not be just the temporary blip that SADC appears to hope for, but might perhaps be engaged in a more sinister realignment and consolidation of military autocracy like that which has happened with military juntas in the Sahel.
Randrianirina, head of the elite Army Corps of Personnel and Administrative and Technical Services (CAPSAT), took control of Madagascar after weeks of service delivery demonstrations by Gen Z protesters and others. It was when the powerful CAPSAT switched sides that Rajoelina fled the country.
High Constitutional Court President Florent Rakotoarisoa then declared the presidential office vacant and transferred power to Randrianirina. The High Constitutional Court confirmed the decision. SADC then determined that, since Randrianirina had been handed power rather than seizing it himself, there had been no coup and therefore did not suspend Madagascar; this was in contrast to the African Union (AU), which immediately deemed the events a coup and suspended the country.
SADC invited Randrianirina to a virtual summit in December and urged him to “initiate a Malagasy-owned and -led inclusive national dialogue during the transitional period, to pave the way for fresh elections, and facilitate the peaceful return of political exiles.” It directed him to submit a dialogue readiness report and a draft transition roadmap by 28 February 2026. On that day, he announced a plan that envisaged a “Sovereign National Consultation” as part of a two-year roadmap to elections.
But will Randrianirina meet the deadline? The transition timetable appears to be slipping. And the continental precedents are not encouraging. There has been a rash of coups this decade, mainly in West Africa. The military juntas that seized power in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger all promised a return to elections and civilian rule within limited timelines, then missed those deadlines.
As in Madagascar, the jury’s still out in Guinea-Bissau, where the military under General Horta Inta-A Na Man seized power in November 2025. Elections have been scheduled for December 2026, but no one’s holding their breath.
In Gabon, Guinea and Chad, junta leaders eventually allowed elections, but ran for office themselves, violating the AU rule , which forbids coup leaders from doing so. They all won, courtesy of the huge advantages of incumbency.
It’s not yet clear whether Madagascar will follow suit, but some of Randrianirina’s actions raised almost immediate questions about his commitment to the transition, including his appointment of an unpopular prime minister and his abrupt firing of the new prime minister and the entire cabinet.
Political scientists Salah Ben Hammou and Jonathan Powell described Madagascar’s 2025 transfer of power as a ‘coupvolution’, a popular revolution culminating in a coup, in an article in Foreign Policy last November. They noted that elsewhere in Africa, protesters had initially welcomed the military’s support for their revolutions, but were then disappointed when the military ignored their demands, simply entrenching itself in power. Egypt in 2013 and Sudan in 2019 are also examples.
Similarly, after the Sahelian coups, civilians welcomed the ousting of unpopular leaders, but then became disillusioned. Hammou and Powell said in Madagascar, protesters were now experiencing “buyer’s remorse” because of Randrianirina’s unilateral government appointments, which raised familiar fears that their revolution had been hijacked.
Powell has subsequently told Africa in Fact that SADC had erred in failing to suspend Madagascar, as there was no justification for a two-year hiatus until new presidential elections, rather than the 60 days stipulated by Article 53 of the constitution. And the transition should have been entrusted to a transitional civilian government, not the military.
Since then, the Gen Z protestors and others have grown even more disillusioned. In April, the Collective of Citizens and Civic Organisations (CCOC) issued a statement to “denounce the lack of real reforms six months after the fall of the previous regime”. “We observe the persistence of ineffective institutions, corruption, the erosion of freedoms, and authoritarian practices,” the CCOC statement said, demanding “a transparent and inclusive transition, with a charter for rebuilding the nation.”
Also, in April this year, Amnesty International issued a statement that it said was, “in response to the escalating crackdown on ‘Generation Z’ activists and members of civil society in Madagascar by the military junta” using “arbitrary arrest, detention, or enforced disappearance simply for expressing concerns about the way their country is being run.”
Another major concern about the junta’s direction has been the growing influence of Russia, particularly its military presence. Starting on 20 December last year, Russia has been donating weapons such as helicopters, attack drones, assault rifles, handguns, anti-tank grenades and armoured infantry fighting vehicles to the junta, according to a comprehensive report by France 24.
Russia has also dispatched soldiers from its Africa Corps to train Malagasy soldiers to use this equipment. That has rather sinister connotations, as the Africa Corps, which replaced the Russian private military company Wagner, has also bolstered military juntas in the Sahel.
On February 19, Randrianirina made his first foreign visit, to Russia, where he was warmly welcomed by President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Randrianirina told Putin that Madagascar was ready to “move our partnership to a new level”.
The junta has offered innocent explanations for the growing Russian military presence, including the need to combat cattle rustlers who appear to be endemic in parts of the country. But some Malagasy are unconvinced. CCOC Secretary-General Hony Radert has called for “much more transparency” about the role of the Russians. “We don’t understand this militarisation,” she told France 24. “What justifies it? Is this truly the priority, given the development needs of the population? Currently, there is no clear explanation for the Russian presence or the military buildup.”
Russia is also spreading its influence beyond the military. “Russia has secured a slot on national radio and is currently in the process of acquiring several private media outlets,” Thierry Vircoulon, an associate researcher at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) Sub-Saharan Africa Centre, told France 24.
The network also reported that a new pro-Russian political party, the Patriotic Awakening of a United Madagascar, had been launched in early March. As in the Sahel and the Central African Republic (CAR), Russia appears to be displacing France in particular, which was widely regarded as close to Rajoelina.
On 28 April, the Malagasy authorities announced they had detained several people, including a former French soldier, accusing them of plotting to incite a security force mutiny and to sabotage infrastructure, according to the Crisis Group. The junta separately declared a French embassy official persona non grata. Paris protested the expulsion, denying social media allegations that the official had been involved in destabilisation actions.
But to Vircoulon, events are following an all-too-familiar playbook. “As seen in the Central African Republic, once they have seized the levers of power, they will drive out Europeans in general – and the French in particular. Then, they will make money,” he told France 24, pointing to the island’s deposits of gold and other minerals.
It certainly looks as though Russia has been working hard over the past six months to secure a durable foothold in a country that sits astride the Mozambique Channel and has become much more strategically important since more international shipping has been diverted away from the unstable Middle East around the Cape of Good Hope.
Regional officials insist there is no cause for concern, as the junta is cooperating with SADC to implement the roadmap to democracy. Yet SADC has been virtually silent about events that have troubled others over the past six months.
Vircoulon told Africa in Fact that the transitional roadmap was already late. “The start of the national dialogue has been repeatedly postponed. The electoral calendar is unrealistic, and no donor is ready to fund the transition.” He added that he believed the Russians had been invited to Madagascar by Randrianirina to help protect him and support his candidacy for the presidency when elections eventually happened, which he believed would happen, but not in 2027.
In all this uncertainty, it is clear that SADC needs to seize the initiative to assess – and publicly announce – whether and why it still regards the junta as a caretaker regime ushering Madagascar toward democracy, rather than something more sinister.
Peter Fabricius
Peter Fabricius is an independent journalist and analyst on foreign policy issues, writing mainly for the Daily Maverick newspaper and the Institute for Security Studies.
