The security crisis in the Sahel has rapidly evolved into one of the most pressing threats to stability in West Africa, with far-reaching implications for regional powers like Nigeria. Once considered a peripheral concern, the deepening instability in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger now poses a direct challenge to Nigeria’s internal security, border integrity, economic vitality, and humanitarian resilience. The Sahel’s descent into violence, marked by the increasing territorial control of jihadist insurgent groups and the impact on state authority, is no longer confined by geographic borders. Instead, it has become a transnational phenomenon that intersects directly with Nigeria’s struggles with insurgency, banditry, and governance deficits in its northern regions.
The Sahel has remained the most lethal theatre of jihadist violence on the African continent for four consecutive years. In 2024 alone, an estimated 10,400 deaths were attributed to militant Islamist violence in the region, accounting for 55% of these fatalities continent-wide, according to an Africa Centre for Strategic Studies report published in February this year.
Groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have significantly increased their operational capacity, capturing territory, attacking state forces, and directly targeting civilians. The 2025 Global Terrorism Index noted that deaths in the Sahel represent more than 50% of global terrorism-related deaths, with the top two terrorist groups in the world, JNIM and ISIS, very active in the region.
These developments are directly relevant to Nigeria due to the transnational reach of these militant groups. Sahelian and Nigerian jihadist networks and organised criminals increasingly use the porous and poorly governed borderlands between Niger and Nigeria as corridors to transport fighters, arms, and illicit goods. The situation in Niger is particularly precarious.
Since the 2023 military coup, the country’s security architecture has continued to face challenges, exacerbated by increasing operational freedom for jihadist factions that now pose a threat to northern Nigeria, particularly Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi, Borno, and Yobe states. Many of these regions are already contending with their own insurgencies – most notably Boko Haram factions, JAS and ISWAP – which have ideological and operational linkages with Sahelian groups. The cross-border convergence of these threats renders Nigeria’s conflict landscape even more complex and difficult to contain.
The effectiveness of Nigeria’s regional security response has been severely compromised by the political ruptures in the Sahel. The wave of military coups in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) has disrupted longstanding multilateral frameworks such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force and significantly weakened the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – of which Nigeria is a centrally key member – as a mechanism for collective security. Following the coup in Niamey, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso withdrew from ECOWAS in 2024, effectively fracturing the West African counterterrorism architecture and undermining Nigeria’s ability to lead or coordinate regional responses.
This fragmentation has practical consequences. Intelligence-sharing, joint border patrols, and coordinated military operations, critical tools in managing transnational threats, have all been curtailed. Nigeria, a principal actor in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) alongside Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, now finds itself operating in an increasingly disconnected security environment. The growing presence of Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group in Mali and Burkina Faso further complicates western and African Union (AU)-backed responses, creating a geopolitical vacuum that jihadist groups have been quick and happy to exploit.
The result is a loss of strategic coherence. Armed groups now operate with greater mobility and less fear of regional coordination, moving seamlessly across borders and leveraging local conflicts, grievances, and governance failures to entrench themselves. Nigeria’s northern frontier has thus become increasingly vulnerable to cross-border insurgency, arms proliferation, and terror financing networks, particularly in areas where the state already has minimal presence.
Beyond the military threat, the Sahel crisis has created humanitarian emergencies and economic disruptions that can easily spill into Nigeria, affecting its long-term stability. The escalation of violence and targeted civilian attacks in the Sahel has displaced millions, with large numbers increasingly likely to seek refuge in Nigeria. Any inflows of refugees will strain Nigeria’s already overburdened humanitarian system, which is contending with more than two million internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to its own internal conflicts.
In addition to humanitarian pressures, insecurity in the Sahel is damaging cross-border economic relations. Northern Nigerian states rely heavily on trade with neighbouring countries for the movement of livestock, grains, and manufactured goods. Conflict-related disruptions to trade routes have negatively affected livelihoods, market stability, and food security across much of the north. Farmers and traders in Sokoto, Katsina, and Kebbi now report chronic difficulties accessing markets due to road insecurity and arbitrary border closures.
The breakdown in governance across the Sahel also threatens to increase youth radicalisation, especially among displaced and marginalised populations who see few alternatives to joining armed groups. In such a volatile environment, jihadist groups can easily weaponise grievances over poverty, neglect, and identity, turning vulnerable communities into potential recruiting pools for insurgency movements operating both inside and outside Nigeria.
Given the scale and proximity of the Sahel crisis, Nigeria must adopt a comprehensive and forward-looking approach to regional security. While military responses remain necessary, they must be nested within broader strategies of regional diplomacy, economic cooperation, and humanitarian assistance. Nigeria should reinvigorate its leadership role within ECOWAS and the AU’s Peace and Security Council, advocating for African-led solutions to the Sahel crisis. This includes facilitating the reintegration of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) countries into regional frameworks and pushing for a restructured security compact that includes shared border governance, community policing, and counter-radicalisation programmes.
Operationally, Nigeria should strengthen its bilateral ties with the AES through joint intelligence-sharing, surveillance operations, and border management initiatives. The deployment of well-trained forces in vulnerable border areas, backed by functional logistics and clear rules of engagement, can help reduce the free movements and influx of arms and fighters. Nigeria must also increase its investment in development projects in border regions, especially in education, water access, rural electrification, and youth employment, to build long-term resilience against extremist influence.
Critically, Nigeria should align its foreign policy and national security strategies with its regional obligations. The Sahel cannot be treated as a buffer zone or an external problem. Events in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have a direct and measurable impact on Nigeria’s sovereignty and internal stability. By framing the Sahel crisis as a national security priority, Nigeria positions itself not only as a frontline state in the fight against terrorism but also as a key architect of West Africa’s future security architecture.
However, Nigeria’s capacity to respond decisively to the crisis in the Sahel is not only constrained by transnational threats but also by a deteriorating regional governance architecture. ECOWAS, once a symbol of regional solidarity and multilateral coordination, is today plagued by a legitimacy crisis. Its institutional tools – such as early warning systems and democratic protocols – have proven ineffective in preventing the spread of military coups or in enforcing constitutional order. The weakness of the ECOWAS Parliament and the political dysfunction in many member states have enabled a culture of impunity, tenure elongation, and elite capture that indirectly fuels insecurity.
This environment has made regional cooperation sporadic and politicised. Nigeria’s own foreign policy incoherence and retreat from its historical leadership role further diminish the prospects for a coordinated response. Once a staunch defender of African liberation and democratic values, Nigeria now lacks a strategic foreign policy direction to guide its engagement with the Sahel crisis. Without reinvigorated leadership from Abuja, ECOWAS risks continued marginalisation, and the Sahel’s instability may become an enduring fixture that further threatens Nigeria’s national security.
To address the growing insecurity emanating from the Sahel and its wider implications for Nigeria, there must be a concerted effort to revitalise regional governance mechanisms and reposition Nigeria as a credible leader within West Africa. ECOWAS needs urgent institutional reform, particularly through the empowerment of its Parliament and the restoration of its early warning and conflict prevention capacities. Nigeria must play a central role in this process, using its diplomatic weight, economic leverage, and historical legitimacy to advocate for the adoption of binding protocols that enforce constitutional order, deter military coups, and promote inclusive governance.
At the same time, Nigeria must recalibrate its foreign policy to reflect long-term strategic interests, prioritising regional security and stability over short-term political gains. This includes not only contributing meaningfully to ECOWAS-led peace and security initiatives but also championing a developmental agenda that addresses the structural drivers of conflict in the Sahel – poverty, youth disenfranchisement, and state fragility. By doing so, Nigeria can help stem the tide of regional instability while safeguarding its own national security and reasserting its leadership in shaping West Africa’s future.
In conclusion, the escalating instability in the Sahel presents Nigeria with one of the most serious external threats to its national security in decades. The growing influence of jihadist groups, the collapse of regional security structures, and the humanitarian and economic fallout all require an integrated and strategic response. By investing in the Sahel’s stability, Nigeria is not merely engaging in regional solidarity – it is securing its own borders, protecting its citizens, and shaping a more stable and prosperous West Africa.
Aliyu Ibrahim Gebi
Aliyu Ibrahim Gebi is the Special Adviser to Nigeria's Chief of Defence Staff on Non-Kinetic Strategies. He also serves as the Coordinator of the National Fusion Centre on Dialogue and Peace Processes for Northeast Nigeria. Gebi is a member of the Nigerian Foreign Minister’s Advisory Group on ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), as well as a member of the Review Committee for the Nigerian National Defence Policy (2017). A former member of the Nigerian House of Representatives, he chaired the House Committee on Internal Security and was a member of the ECOWAS Parliament, where he held the position of Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Trade, Customs, and Free Movement of Persons.
