We are living in an age of greater uncertainty. The international system that emerged after the end of the Second World War (1945) as bipolar, transitioned into a unipolar one after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. The period of American hegemony (unipolarity), which emerged after the beginning of the 1990s, gave way to a multipolar order.
The present change, characterised by the relative decline of US hegemony and the rise of major powers like China, a resurgent Russia, and middle powers such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has strong implications for the security of regions like the Horn of Africa. The region straddles Asia and Africa and occupies a strategic location that commands a substantial amount of global trade flow. All these make the region an arena of intense external competition.
Since the beginning of the 2020s, there has been a subtle but sure strategic shift in the US’s global military posture. Due to the rise of China and its assertive policies in regions like the South China Sea and towards Taiwan, the Americans are engaged in what they call the “Asia pivot”. Moreover, the US and its Western allies seek to counter resurgent Russia, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. All these created opportunities for emerging great powers and Middle Eastern powers to play major roles in the politics, security, and economics of the Horn of Africa.
For instance, China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has financed and constructed critical infrastructure in the region. It also established its first overseas naval base in Djibouti in 2017 with the goal of safeguarding its substantial investments and trade routes. The Horn of Africa has also become an extension of the Middle East and a laboratory for power projection for countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Qatar. The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen (since 2015) and the subsequent crisis among the countries of the Gulf (2017-2021), in which Qatar, which was accused of supporting extremist groups, put pressure on the countries of the Horn of Africa to choose sides.
The Horn of Africa suffers from deep-seated vulnerabilities, including weak and contested governance, economic underdevelopment, recurring droughts, border disputes, and tensions and conflicts over shared resources like the Nile waters. These internal challenges are actively exploited by external powers seeking leverage and advantage, transforming domestic conflicts into regionalised and internationalised crises.
Ethiopia – the conflict in the north: The Tigray civil war (2020-2022) was ignited primarily due to a power struggle among member organisations of the former Ethiopian ruling front—the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). But the conflict also drew in the participation of external actors. Eritrea deployed its troops in support of the government, while Türkiye and the UAE provided military support to Addis Ababa. Conversely, Egypt, which considers Ethiopia its arch-nemesis due to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile, reportedly sought to exploit the situation by offering support to rebel forces, including the TPLF.
Somalia’s Sovereignty: The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu struggles to pacify the country by containing the Al-Shabaab insurgency at the same time as it seeks to assert authority over Somaliland (de facto independent since 1991) and Puntland (an autonomous region within Somalia). Somalia’s fragile security situation creates fertile ground for external manipulation. In this respect, the Somaliland-UAE 2016 agreement to develop the Berbera port without Mogadishu’s consent directly challenged the FGS’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, leading Somalia to ban Dubai Ports (DP) World and declare the agreements null and void. Türkiye, in response, has become the FGS’s primary international partner, investing heavily in Mogadishu’s infrastructure (ports, airports), establishing its largest overseas military base to train Somali forces, and signing agreements for naval development and resource exploration. While contributing to state-building, Ankara’s deep involvement also aligns it with specific factions within Somalia’s complex political landscape.
Sudan’s internationalised conflict: The brutal civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) exemplifies how quickly internal power struggles become proxies for regional and global competition. Egypt firmly backs the SAF, aiming to protect its interests concerning the Nile waters and counter perceived Ethiopian influence. The UAE provides substantial military and financial support to the RSF, seeking lucrative mining and agricultural concessions and influence over Sudan’s future political trajectory. Eritrea initially supported the RSF but later shifted its support to the SAF. This external backing, driven by competing Gulf and regional agendas, has paralysed mediation efforts and prolonged the suffering, demonstrating the “insecurity spillover” effect.
A major manifestation of power competition in the Horn of Africa has been the competition for military bases and ports.
Militarisation: Djibouti, tiny but critically located, epitomises this trend, hosting military bases for the US (Camp Lemonnier), China, France, Italy, and Japan. The proximity of China’s base (established in 2017) to the US facility highlights the direct nature of great power competition. Türkiye’s military base in Somalia and Qatar’s and Russian interests in Sudanese ports add further layers. This concentration makes the Horn of Africa one of the world’s most militarised regions.
The scramble for ports: There is intense competition in the region for control of ports and maritime infrastructure. The UAE has pursued a rather assertive policy of asserting dominance/control over the key ports of the region. It entered an agreement in 2016 with the Somaliland authorities to develop the Berbera port. A similar agreement was signed in 2022 with the autonomous Puntland authorities to develop the Bossaso port. It also entered into an agreement with Eritrea in 2016 for the development and use of the Assab port. In 2025, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia agreed to develop the Assab port by the latter. The UAE’s assertive policy of acquiring ports, which in some cases bypasses national governments, has the potential to create tensions in the region.
Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea: Landlocked Ethiopia’s quest for direct sea access reached a critical juncture with the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland. This deal, offering Ethiopia naval and commercial access to the Red Sea in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence and a stake in Ethiopian Airlines, ignited strong opposition from Somalia. Somalia immediately declared the agreement “null and void” and engaged in active diplomacy to thwart it. The agreement was also divisive in the region.
Egypt, Eritrea, and Türkiye swiftly backed Mogadishu’s position, while the UAE appeared to have provided tacit support to Addis Ababa. This dispute directly intersects with the entrenched Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry over the GERD and Nile waters, as Cairo views Ethiopian sea access as strengthening Addis Ababa’s overall strategic posture. Furthermore, as Ethiopia’s bid to access the sea threatens its lucrative income of over $1.5 billion annually, Djibouti opposed the MoU and Ethiopia’s quest for a foothold over the Red Sea littoral. The tension stoked following the MoU was reduced through the mediation of Türkiye, highlighting the sidelining of regional bodies.
In conclusion, the Horn of Africa is affected by the global power transition and intense regional rivalries. While the engagement of emerging powers like China, Türkiye, and the Gulf states brings much-needed investment in infrastructure and offers alternatives to traditional Western partners, the costs are increasingly apparent. The pervasive militarisation, the scramble for ports, and the shifting (changing) nature of the alignment structure affect the security of the region. More seriously, the propensity of external powers to instrumentalise local conflicts and political fragmentation to further their own strategic objectives leads to “insecurity spillover” and makes the conflicts protracted.
One major impact of the reconfiguration of the power structure and the proliferation of external actors has been the sidelining of African-led solutions. As discussed earlier, external powers back opposing factions and pursue parallel diplomatic tracks, as demonstrated by the Saudi/UAE-mediated Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal and Türkiye’s intervention in the Ethio-Somaliland MoU. The countries of the Horn of Africa should be cognisant of the complexity and fluid nature of alliances in the multipolar context and work more on domestic and African approaches for the resolution of their crises and conflicts. Hence, it is very important to strengthen institutions like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU so that they play active roles in conflict prevention and management.
Asnake Kefale is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Addis Ababa University. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Leiden, an MA in international relations from the International University of Japan, and a BA from Addis Ababa University. His research focuses on Horn of Africa security, migration, ethnicity, and federalism. He co-edited Youth on the Move: Views from Below on Ethiopian International Migration(Hurst, 2021).
