When I stood among colleagues and heads of state at the official launch of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) in 2010, in Gaborone, Botswana, I felt both pride and apprehension. Pride because this marked a decisive shift in how our region approached peace and security responses by no longer just reacting to crises but instead actively anticipating them. I felt apprehensive because an initiative of this kind had never been attempted before, and we knew it would face considerable political, logistical, and technical obstacles.
It’s been 15 years since the centre was launched, and when I reflect on it now, what stands out isn’t just the milestones. It is also the challenging lessons, the moments that forced us as analysts to adapt quickly, and the determined resilience that carried us forward.
The SADC Early Warning System (EWS) was created not just to gather intelligence but to bridge a vital gap between analysis and action in a region too often afflicted by conflict, natural disasters, and political instability. Our mandate was (and still is today) somewhat ambitious – to provide timely, reliable, and actionable intelligence to the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and member states to prevent the escalation of emerging threats (SADC Secretariat, 2010).
Perhaps the REWC’s greatest strengths are also the most overlooked. Its innovative approach to intelligence cooperation brings together security officers from across member states to sit side by side, build trust, and openly share information in real time.
In a world where intelligence is traditionally guarded and compartmentalised, this model represents a remarkable leap in regional foresight and collaboration. By promoting an environment where national representatives engage directly within a shared space, the REWC breaks down long-standing barriers of suspicion and rivalry. This quiet yet profound innovation has transformed the intelligence landscape in southern Africa, enabling quicker, more coordinated responses to emerging threats and laying the foundation for a truly collective security architecture long after analysts have concluded their assignments at the REWC.
This article reflects on the dualities defining the journey, the successes validating its existence, and the challenges constantly testing its capacity.
The seeds of the SADC Early Warning System were sown during the early 2000s when the region was repeatedly caught off guard. Political turmoil in Zimbabwe, unrest in Lesotho, and intermittent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) all exposed the need for a more systematic regional response.
In 2006, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council called for the creation of regional early warning centres under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). SADC responded by forming a working group to design its own system, drawing inspiration from models such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Warning and Response Network(ECOWARN) and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) in East Africa. The centre was envisioned as the region’s eyes and ears.
One of the initial achievements was establishing an indicator-based monitoring system. This system tracks political, economic, environmental, and social triggers, allowing the centre to model scenarios and identify potential hotspots (SADC Secretariat, 2010). Over time, members began contributing more consistently, leading to a strong network of national focal points trained across all 16 states.
Their contributions offered real-time insight into various potential crises stemming from food insecurity in Madagascar to political and election unrest in several SADC member states. This network has since become the key to compiling early warning assessments.
REWC alerts have, on several occasions, strengthened preventive diplomacy and mediation missions. For instance, in 2014, early assessments flagged mounting tensions in Lesotho. This led to diplomatic engagements by the SADC Organ Troika and a subsequent observation mission deployed to the kingdom, a clear example of early warning translating into swift regional action.
Similarly, early risk modelling ahead of the 2019 DRC elections informed the deployment of a preventive SADC Electoral Advisory Council mission, which helped lower tensions in a fragile transition. While outcomes are shaped by many actors, the inputs are often what catalyse initial engagement. These outcomes may not make headlines; however, the absence of conflict is among the clearest signs of the REWC’s impact, reflecting the consistent and often unseen efforts of its team.
Another significant milestone has been integration with the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Facilitated by the CEWS situation room in Addis Ababa, this linkage allows the REWC to contribute to and benefit from a broader continental risk outlook, according to the AU. This coordination has been especially critical in addressing threats that transcend national borders, such as the insurgency in northern Mozambique.
The insurgency in Cabo Delgado province is a cautionary tale. Long before the violence escalated in 2017, warnings came from civil society, the media, and security analysts about the risks Islamist extremism posed, marginalisation, and illicit economies.
Despite this, regional response was slow and delayed by political tensions behind closed doors. The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was only deployed in 2021, after militants had already seized territory and displaced thousands.
The problem wasn’t a lack of warning but rather a lack of political will and coordination. This highlights a critical limitation; while the REWC may detect and analyse threats, it lacks the authority to compel action. Without binding protocols or robust political commitment, early warning may remain largely symbolic.
Despite analytical strength, a recurring challenge persists – the disconnection between early warning and early response. The REWC can issue detailed and timely reports, but the political machinery that should act on them often hesitates due to sovereignty sensitivities or a lack of consensus.
In the case of Cabo Delgado, the centre’s reports had flagged growing extremist activity and local discontent as early as 2017. Yet, a meaningful regional response came only after the violence spiralled, displacing thousands. The REWC has no operational mandate as it informs but does not intervene. This leaves the REWC reliant on political will, which is frequently constrained by competing national interests or a wariness of setting precedents.
Also, although the REWC was created with high-level commitment, sustaining some of its work has often relied on external donor funding. Budget constraints have affected staffing levels, training capacity, and investment in technology. While SADC has made strides toward internal ownership, the reality is that many of the most critical activities, including software maintenance and analyst training, still depend on development partners.
In addition, the systems were originally designed to monitor conventional conflict indicators, but the threat landscape has evolved dramatically. Today, disinformation, cyber threats, climate shocks, and violent extremism are rising concerns. These demand new tools, including artificial intelligence, social media analysis, and big data mining areas, which may require a degree of recalibration and focus to adequately address these new threats.
Without strategic investment in digital transformation, the system risks falling behind in understanding the true dynamics of modern security threats.
Being part of the original group of REWC analysts was a privilege. Intelligence in this context is not about total awareness but rather about identifying risks early enough to make a difference. I’ve seen how much can be achieved when the system is respected and, unfortunately, how much is lost when warnings are ignored.
I’ve had the privilege of working with analysts from across the region who contribute not only strong technical expertise but also a deep understanding of local contexts. I’ve seen national focal points evolve from peripheral actors to strategic voices. And I’ve seen how, even when progress is gradual and challenging, regional cooperation can build meaningful consensus and lead to decisive action.
Going forward, to remain relevant and effective, the SADC REWC must be strengthened and supported not just in words but in institutional influence.
- Institutional strengthening – Embed the REWC more deeply within SADC’s core structures, with budget guarantees and formalised reporting mechanisms.
- Rapid response protocols – Establish clear thresholds that trigger diplomatic or security interventions to reduce delays between warnings and action.
- Technological investment – Expand tools for horizon scanning, AI-driven trend detection, and open-source intelligence.
- Public engagement – Make non-sensitive trend analyses publicly accessible to build trust and extend civic participation.
Finally, the SADC Early Warning System is not flawless – no early warning system is. But it remains a cornerstone of regional peacebuilding infrastructure. As someone who helped launch and build it, I can attest to its value. We cannot always prevent conflict. But with the proper support, we can anticipate a crisis. And sometimes, that is the difference between peace and catastrophe.
Dr Craig Moffat served as an analyst at the SADC Early Warning Centre during his tenure with the South African Foreign Service. He was also a Senior Research Fellow in the Research Group on Peace, Conflict, and Development at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Prior to that, he was the Head of the Programme for Governance Delivery and Impact at Good Governance Africa. Dr Moffat holds a PhD in Political Science from Stellenbosch University.
