The number of Somali pirate attacks nosedived from 2017 as a result of international naval intervention, and the same thing has started to happen more recently in the Gulf of Guinea. This success has underlined the benefits of international cooperation in tackling insecurity. Yet Somali pirates have renewed their attacks over the past 12 months, highlighting the fact that the underlying causes of poverty and weak government have still not been addressed.
It is often argued that Somali piracy sprang up because of the lack of an effective centralised state in the country in the decades following the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991. While this played a significant role, it was not the only factor. Poverty, the lack of licit economic pursuits, and overfishing by foreign fishing fleets were also big factors.
In the absence of domestic governance over the fishing industry, foreign trawlers began operating in Somali waters. By 2003, foreign companies were catching more than 10 times the volume of fish of Somali fishermen, according to a report published in the World Affairs journal in 2017, driving down local living standards. Some Somalis accused foreign trawler crews of stealing or destroying their boats, or even murdering Somali fishermen.
Somali fishermen began to arm themselves in the 1990s in response. Some of these groups gradually transformed into criminal enterprises, attacking foreign fishing boats and other vessels. The revenue enabled them to invest in faster boats and more sophisticated weapons to scale up their operations.
The country is ideally placed for piracy, as it is located on the approaches to the Bab el-Mandeb, the gateway to the Red Sea and Suez Canal, which attracts 12% of global shipping. Pirate economies developed in the Somali towns of Caluula, Eyl, Hobye and Xaafuun. They began operating further out to sea, even attacking vessels as far south as Madagascar and the Maldives.
Somalia quickly became the centre of world pirate activity, with 237 attacks in 2011 alone, more than the world total. Other attacks may not have even been reported by owners who fear reprisals and increased insurance premiums. The World Bank estimates that Somali pirate gangs earned $339 – 413 million over 2005-12.
Pirates often operate at sea in a mother ship, such as a large fishing vessel, but transfer into speedboats to carry out the actual attacks. This makes it easy to catch slow-moving container, bulk, and oil vessels, which they can board quickly via ladders from the speedboats.
In response, many cargo ships were equipped with barbed wire defences, and crews used high-pressure hosepipes to force attackers off. Higher-value ships employed security personnel, while some owners opted to divert their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing fuel, insurance, and crew costs and delaying transport.
The impact on international trade was so significant that more than 20 countries sent warships to the western Indian Ocean to combat the pirates. African countries also began working together, with the South African, Mozambican and Tanzanian navies launching Operation Copper in 2011 to patrol for pirates further south.
Some countries were reluctant to prosecute captured pirates because of the costs and legal complications involved in successfully prosecuting those captured outside any country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). However, the Seychelles played a key role in 2011 by legislating to allow it to house suspected criminals captured anywhere in the Indian Ocean, with Somali pirates accounting for 20% of its prison population by the following year.
Also, in 2012, the UN helped set up and then monitor a prison in Somalia itself, where pirates could be housed. This international effort eventually paid off, and there was no attempted attack off Somalia between 2020 and 2022.
However, as piracy was contained in the Indian Ocean, it became an increasing problem further west. Gulf of Guinea piracy appears to have been borne out of criminal activity in the Niger Delta, where well-armed gangs steal huge volumes of oil, evading military patrols by various means in the process. With many vessels carrying valuable cargoes passing through their areas of operation, it is little surprise that the petro-gangs began targeting a growing range of ships.
Pirate gangs were initially able to exploit the ineffectiveness of West African naval forces and the poor coordination between them. For instance, the number of attacks in Nigerian waters declined in 2017 and 2018 when the Nigerian navy stepped up patrols, but the pirates merely waited until vessels entered Benin’s maritime territory before striking.
Somali piracy tends to focus on taking vessels and crews for ransom, often operating far out to sea. By contrast, their Gulf of Guinea counterparts mainly rely on kidnapping crew members and stealing oil and other cargo for onward sale, usually relatively close to shore. The region’s pirates are particularly well-armed, including with rocket-propelled grenades, because of the prevalence of weapons in the Niger Delta.
As in the Indian Ocean, the solution in the Gulf of Guinea has been greater cooperation, with the US, UK, France, India and Brazil among the countries providing naval patrols, although they have local partners to work with here. Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon have mounted joint exercises and naval patrols to improve their maritime surveillance capabilities. The Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System, which became operational in 2020, facilitates information sharing and coordination between countries in the region.
As a result, the number of pirate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea fell from 81 in 2020 to 18 in 2024, although attacks in the region are often more serious than elsewhere. At least 130 crew members were taken in 2020, while the region also accounted for all 12 crew kidnapped anywhere in the world last year, and 23% of all hostages taken by pirates in 2024.
While the number of incidents has fallen, attacks continue. There were six incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in the first quarter of 2025, with 13 crew kidnapped. However, the military presence has displaced pirate activity, with Angola and Equatorial Guinea now experiencing most attacks. Most West African incidents last year occurred while vessels were berthed or anchored, rather than out at sea.
As in Somalia, prosecution has been a challenge. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime advises local maritime law enforcement. Still, according to the European Union Institute for Security Studies, there have been just three prosecutions of Gulf of Guinea pirates in the past decade: in Togo, Nigeria, and Denmark.
In many ways, all African piracy is a symptom of broader underlying issues, including poverty and the lack of alternative, legitimate ways of earning a living. The absence of an effective government in Somalia plays a significant role off the east coast, with many Somali gangs based in the semi-autonomous territory of Puntland, which broke away from Somalia during the civil war.
Weak government and the strength of organised crime and corruption help create an environment in Nigeria within which piracy can flourish. Ending the threat while the Delta remains a centre of organised crime will be difficult. None of these issues has been addressed, as international efforts have instead focused on military responses.
Due to the failure to tackle these root causes, there was always a threat that the number of incidents could increase. Although there had been little pirate activity offshore Somalia since 2017, the problem re-emerged in what the BBC described as “Somali piracy 2.0”. Nine attacks were reported in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden between December 2023 and May 2024, including three hijackings. A bulk carrier and two fishing vessels were taken along with their crews, one of which was seized 1,000 nautical miles offshore.
Another three attacks occurred in February and March this year, two on fishing vessels and another on a dhow, with 26 crew taken hostage, although all were eventually released. It is unknown if any ransoms were paid; shipping lines rarely admit to doing so in case it encourages attacks by other gangs. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has said that other attacks may have occurred but not been reported.
The re-emergence of Somali piracy has been widely linked to the ongoing Yemeni civil war and attacks on international shipping by the Houthi rebels. While some have suggested direct links between the Houthis and Somali pirates, it seems more likely that the pirates are merely exploiting the switch in international attention from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea following the Houthi attacks.
Indeed, the first of the new wave of pirate attacks came in December 2023, just one month after the Houthis began targeting cargo ships. That month, the MV Reun became the first merchant vessel to be successfully hijacked by Somali pirates since 2017.
In a report to the UN Security Council in October 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen noted: “Increased smuggling activities involving small arms and light weapons are observed between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with indications of shared military supplies or a common supplier.” Al-Shabaab is the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group fighting the Somali government, so weapons appear to be moving across the Bab el-Mandeb.
The withdrawal of naval patrols also appears to have contributed to the resumption of Somali piracy. After years of relative peace, the UN Security Council opted not to extend the powers of international navies to operate in Somali waters in 2022. Then, in January 2023, the Indian Ocean High Risk Area designation for particularly dangerous parts of the Indian Ocean was lifted. Many shipping lines also stopped carrying armed guards.
Efforts to tackle Somali and Gulf of Guinea piracy highlight the benefits of cooperation between African states and the need for international support. Yet they also emphasise the shortcomings of solely relying on military solutions to such problems. It is also disappointing that the international community is only sufficiently motivated to help tackle such problems when they affect their own trade patterns, rather than also seeking to help when the impact is limited to Africa.
Dr Neil Alexander Ford has been a freelance consultant and journalist on African affairs for more than two decades. He covers a wide range of topics from international relations and organised crime to cross-border trade and renewable energy. Consultancy clients include international organisations, law firms and financial services companies, and he has acted as an expert witness in Africa-related legal cases. He has a PhD on East Africa’s international boundaries, ranging over the effect on regional economies; cross-border political disputes; and the impact of the boundaries on local communities, such as the Maasai.
