In July 2023, soldiers in Niger overthrew the democratically elected government, citing widespread insecurity and public dissatisfaction with President Mohamed Bazoum. It was the fifth coup in the Sahel in under three years, and it deepened concerns in an international community that had grown weary of the resurgence of military takeovers across parts of Africa.
Despite coordinated pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Niger’s junta, alongside its counterparts in Mali and Burkina Faso, not only maintained its grip on power but also withdrew from ECOWAS and formed an ad hoc regional security alliance.
Niger’s coup, like those in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Sudan, has reignited debates about governance failure and democratic fragility in the region. Leaders of the 2023 Niger coup and the 2022 takeover in Burkina Faso pointed to their governments’ failure to contain the deadly Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel as part of the justification for seizing power.
Broadly, researchers, academics, and policy practitioners often attribute the resurgence of coups in Africa to poor governance. This article puts that claim to the test by examining whether decades of data across the African continent reveal a measurable relationship between weak governance, economic outcomes, and the occurrence of coups.
A coup d’état, or “coup”, refers to the sudden and unlawful seizure of power from a sitting government (usually targeting the executive). It is typically carried out by actors with formal ties to the state, most often the military. This definition excludes popular uprisings, rebellions, or mass protests led by those outside the government.
While some definitions restrict coups to military-led actions, American researchers, Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, have argued that this narrows the scope too much and tends to bias data toward successful coups. They point out that many coup attempts are also initiated by civilian elites, with military support determining their success, such as the failed 1962 coup by Senegalese Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, who lacked military backing.
To qualify as a coup, the perpetrators must also be part of the state apparatus, excluding actions driven primarily by foreign powers. Thyne and Powell gave the 1979 ousting of Ugandan President Idi Amin by Tanzanian forces as an example, but it does not count as a coup under this framework.
While coups were widespread during the Cold War, they have become more geographically concentrated in recent decades, especially in regions like Africa and the Sahel. As Figure 1 shows, Africa has experienced more coup attempts since 1950 than any other region in the world, 220 in total, with 109 successful. This means that nearly half (45%) of all global coup attempts during this period occurred on the African continent. Latin America follows with 146 (30% of global coup attempts), while regions like East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe trail far behind.
Powell and Thyne reveal that, although coup attempts have become less common globally in recent decades, those that do occur are now more likely to succeed than in the past. In other words, coups are rarer but increasingly successful.
Figure 1: Coup Attempts by Region since 1950. Data source: Powell, Jonathan & Clayton Thyne (2011).
Figure 2 further shows which African countries have been most affected by takeovers since 1950. Out of 54 countries on the African continent, 45 have had at least one coup attempt since 1950. Sudan leads the continent, with 18 attempted coups and six successful attempts, followed by Burundi (11 total attempts with five successful), Burkina Faso (10 attempts and nine successful), Ghana (10 attempts, five successful), and Sierra Leone (10 attempts, five successful). The figure also shows that the trend is not limited to conflict-prone states. African countries with differing colonial legacies, political systems, and economic dynamics have all experienced attempts at unconstitutional regime change.
Figure 2: Coups in African Countries since 1950. Data sources: Powell, Jonathan & Clayton Thyne (2011); Voice of America News (2023).
So, what explains this trend? Weak governance is widely believed to play a key role in destabilising regimes and eroding institutional legitimacy. To test this hypothesis empirically, I used data from two key sources. The first is Powell and Thyne’s coup dataset, which tracks both successful and failed coup attempts globally since 1950. For the researchers, a coup is considered successful if the coup plotters held power for at least one week.
The second data set is the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), particularly government effectiveness and control of corruption (1996 to 2023), combined into a governance quality index. Professor Rod Alence of Wits University defines governance quality as the effectiveness of the state in formulating and implementing public policy while safeguarding public resources from private interests. I also included the World Bank’s GDP per capita indicator (2000 to 2023) as a measure of a country’s economic or material strength.
Table 1 presents the correlation results between the predictors and coup attempts (successful and total attempts).
| R_value (Total attempts) | R_value (Successful attempts) | |
| Governance quality | -0.36 *** | -0.22 |
| Control of corruption | -0.34 *** | -0.20 |
| Government effectiveness | -0.36 *** | -0.22 |
| GDP per capita (log) | -0.38 *** | -0.34 ** |
Table 1: Pearson correlation between Predictors and Coup Attempts. Stars indicate statistical significance levels, where p ≤ 0.01 (***), p ≤ 0.05 (**), and p ≤ 0.10 (*); values without stars are not statistically significant (p > 0.10).
The results show that over the past decades, African countries with lower governance quality, measured by weak government effectiveness and higher corruption, are significantly more likely to experience coup attempts. Notably, government effectiveness shows a slightly stronger negative correlation with total attempts than with control of corruption. This suggests that the state’s capacity to formulate and implement public policy and deliver public services is more critical in deterring coups than anti-corruption measures alone.
The results support the long-held assumption that poor governance undermines institutional legitimacy, fosters elite and popular disillusionment, and creates conditions where military interventions are more likely to occur in Africa.
GDP per capita, our measure of economic strength, also shows the strongest negative correlation with total coup attempts, suggesting that more economically developed African countries tend to experience fewer coups. Higher GDP per capita may reflect better-funded institutions, professionalised security forces, and greater public investment, all of which contribute to political stability.
However, when it comes to successful coups, the picture changes slightly. Governance indicators (while negatively associated) no longer show statistically significant correlations. Interestingly, GDP per capita remains negatively and significantly correlated with successful coups.
Why would economic strength matter more for the success of a coup than governance quality? One possibility is that once a coup is initiated, its outcome depends less on institutional strength and more on the state’s material capacity to resist. Wealthier states may have better-funded militaries, more loyal elites, and greater access to external diplomatic support, all of which help prevent coups from succeeding. In contrast, poorer countries, where development is weak and economic opportunity is limited, may be more vulnerable once a coup is underway.
This interpretation fits the African context well. In the Sahel region, for example, where military takeovers have surged in recent years, countries like Niger and Mali rank low in governance and development indicators. Niger, in particular, had a GDP per capita (constant US$) of $567 in 2022 – 77% below the African average of $2,486 for that year – and dropped to $562 in 2023, 78% below the continental average of $2,540.
Niger also scored poorly on the World Bank’s governance indices. The military justified its takeover by pointing to the government’s inability to contain jihadist violence and deliver services, both hallmarks of institutional weakness. These characteristics mirror the very risk profile described in the data.
Military grievances, institutional exclusion, and external actors have also shaped recent coups in the Sahel. In several cases, militaries have cited poor resourcing, political marginalisation, or frustration with civilian leadership as justifications for seizing power.
Foreign actors have also played a role, particularly the Wagner Group (or African Corps), a Russian paramilitary organisation that has close links to the Russian armed forces, Russian oligarchs, and Russian-based transnational criminal syndicates. The group has reportedly established ties with junta governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and other Sahelian states and is often cited as a key player in the region’s recent coups.
Photo: Gousno / AFP
Speaking at the International Conference on ECOWAS at 50 in Lagos, Nigeria, in May this year, German Consul General Weert Borner cautioned West African leaders against partnering with Russia on peace and security initiatives. He argued that such partnerships are not rooted in mutual respect or genuine concern for stability. According to Borner, Moscow’s involvement shows a “power and resource” game aimed at shaping how resources are allocated and distributed across the continent.
In recent years, coup rumours have also become increasingly common across West Africa, driven partly by social media campaigns that appear to valorise military takeovers and sow distrust in civilian governments. Some analysts argue that these campaigns may be backed by foreign actors, including Russian-linked networks, aiming to destabilise democratically elected regimes and expand geopolitical influence.
Nigerian journalist Oluwatosin Ogunjuyigbe observes that the recent wave of successful military takeovers in the Sahel has sparked growing speculation and anxiety in neighbouring countries about who might be next.
In May this year, rumours of a coup in Côte d’Ivoire circulated widely on social media, triggering public concern. Although no official government statement had been issued to debunk the rumours at the time of writing, President Alassane Ouattara was seen presiding over a cabinet meeting at the presidential palace in Abidjan days later. The Ivorian presidency released images and a statement confirming his presence alongside key ministers, implicitly putting the speculation to rest.
Contrast Niger and other Sahelian juntas with a country like Ghana. Although it experienced multiple coups in the 1970s and 1980s, Ghana’s governance and economic indicators have improved steadily since the 1990s. Its institutions are stronger, its press is freer, and its military is more professional. Despite political tensions, Ghana has remained coup-free for more than three decades.
Another telling case is Sudan. Despite being rich in natural resources like oil, gold, and fertile land, Sudan has long suffered profound governance failures. These include widespread corruption, a lack of institutional checks and balances, elite power struggles, and a record of military interference in civilian politics. Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has experienced 18 coup attempts, the highest number on the continent, with several resulting in regime change.
The country’s long history of instability includes the 1989 coup that brought Omar al-Bashir to power, initiating a 30-year authoritarian rule marked by brutal repression, international sanctions, and economic decline. His eventual ousting in 2019 by the military, following months of mass protests, led to a fragile civilian-military transitional government, only for another coup to occur in October 2021, derailing hopes for democratic reform.
Most recently, in April 2023, a violent power struggle erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, both factions of the military elite, plunging the country into a devastating civil conflict. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) recorded over 28,700 reported fatalities by the end of November 2024, including more than 7,500 civilians killed in direct attacks, as humanitarian conditions worsen.
Sudan’s case shows how institutional fragility can drive repeated coups. Good Governance Africa’s head of peace and security, Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, has noted that in fragile states, governments often contend with multiple forms of conflict simultaneously, involving a variety of state and non-state actors, including non-state armed groups, regional terrorist networks, transnational criminal syndicates, and malign foreign state interests, which complicate efforts to establish peace and stability. Even in resource-rich settings, when political institutions are weak, military elites fractured, and accountability mechanisms absent, the path to power is often paved through force.
Coups destabilise countries, derail democratic progress, and often usher in new cycles of repression. Understanding the conditions that give rise to coups is vital for designing effective policy interventions to prevent them and promote political stability in Africa.
Decades of data used in this article suggest that strengthening governance and improving economic outcomes are associated with a lower likelihood of coup attempts for African leaders and their international partners. The patterns highlight the potential value of investing in anti-corruption institutions and initiatives, professionalising the military, effective policy formulation and implementation, and delivering basic services to ensure political stability.
However, while good governance may deter coup attempts, a country’s economic or material strength is more strongly associated with whether the attempt succeeds – African countries with greater capacity are less likely to see coup attempts succeed. Lastly, as the analysis is correlational, accounting for potentially confounding factors may yield different conclusions.
Nnaemeka is a Senior Data Analyst at Good Governance Africa. He is also completing a PhD in Applied Data Science at the University of Johannesburg, funded by South Africa’s Department of Science, Technology and Innovation. Much of his research explores socio-political issues like human development, governance, bias, and disinformation, using data science. He has published research in scholarly journals like EPJ Data Science, Journal of Computational Social Science, Politeia, and The Africa Governance Papers. He has experience working as a Data Consultant at DataEQ Consulting and has taught at the University of the Witwatersrand both in South Africa.
